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ABSTRACT
Asymmetric schemes belong to second generation of watermarking. Whereas their need and advantage are well
understood, many doubts have been raised about their robustness and security. Four dierent asymmetric schemes
have been proposed up to now. Whereas they were seemingly relying on completely dierent concepts, they share
the same performances. Exploring in detail these concepts, the authors propose a common formulation of the four
dierent detector processes. This allows to stress common features about security of asymmetric schemes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This introduction explains the notions of asymmetry and public key detection. To clearly state their need and desired
advantages, we rst focus on a short state of the art.
1.1. State of the art
At the beginning of the watermarking story, researchers named private detection schemes techniques which need the
original contents (also called the cover contents) at the detection side. Only trusted person could detect watermarks,
hence the term private detection. The term public detection schemes (also called blind schemes) designs techniques
where no knowledge of these original contents are required to detect the presence of the watermarks and to retrieve
the embedded messages.
The detection may also need a secret key. It grants the ability of detection to a restricted population, or a
restricted class of appliances. It also provides more security. As the pirate has not the key, he does not know how the
original content has been modied (or what secret signal has been added to the original content). He may only blindly
attack using coarse compression, low-pass ltering, cropping, scaling etc etc. In still image applications, A. De Rosa
and al. managed a technique robust against a JPEG compression of quality factor 5%.
1
In video watermarking,
joint teams from IBM / NEC, and Philips / Macrovision / Digimarc achieved to fulll the strict requirements of the
MPAA. Yet, some blind attacks are still working. The recent SDMI challenge is, for instance, a perfect illustration
for audio watermarking domain.
2
But, the robustness against these blind attacks is relentlessly improving. Pirates
always succeed to forge contents, but the quality of the forge contents is getting worse and worse.
A solution for pirates may be to discover the secret key. In most techniques, this allows them to produce very
high quality forged contents (by subtracting the secret signal). Yet, the impact of the secret key disclosure depends
on the application. For copyright protection system, it is likely that this secret key depends on the number ID of
the author, the registration number of the content, a time stamp, etc etc. Hence, the secret key is dierent for
each copyrighted content. The disclosure of one secret key allows pirates to forge one content. On the opposite,
in the copy protection framework, all compliant devices share the same secret key and all the protected contents
are watermarked in the same way. The disclosure of this unique secret key pulls down the copy protection system
because pirates are able to forge all contents.
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How to nd the secret key? A possibility is to `steal' it. Pirates may reverse engineer the detection process, thus
disclose the secret key. This is a real threat in the copy protection framework. Another possibility is to estimate
the secret key with classical signal processing tools. This is possible whenever the watermark signal is not properly
sealed to the content. Adding the secret signal in uniform areas of images is not only a bad idea from a perceptual
point of view but also a deep security aw. This helps the pirate to estimate part of this secrete key.
3
The same
analysis holds when one substitutes part of sound content in frequency bins where human ear is not perceptible
with part of the watermark signal. The same danger holds in image watermarking when the secret signal is not low
pass ltered.
4
F. Hartung and al. stressed conditions to securely bound secrete signal and covert content from a
statistical point of view so that the pirate cannot estimate the secret signal with a Wiener lter.
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Once again, we
stress that these attacks are important in copy protection because pirates not only estimate the secret signal for one
piece of content but for every protected image. Geometrically speaking, even if they do not estimate exactly the
secret, they nd an estimated secret key suciently colinear to remove enough watermark energy, as mentioned in
[4]. More sophisticated attacks on the detection process are also possible.
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For instance, assuming the pirate has
a detector device he tests as many times he likes (which is the case in the copy protection framework), he nally
manages to create a forged content using the detector O(N) times. This security aw is due to the linearity of the
detection process.
More theoritical works from Mittelholzer
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proves that with this conventional spread spectrum scheme, the only
way to achieve a perfectly secure system is to never use the same secret signal. Hence, the pirate cannot get any
mutual information about the secret key from watermarked contents. This is the Shannon cryptographic theorem
translated into the watermarking issue and the previous requirement is the equivalent of the one-time pad stream
cipher principle.
1.2. Asymmetry and public key scheme
The problems listed above stem from the symmetry of classical watermarking schemes. The secret watermark signal
added by the embedding process is also known by the detector. If the detector could work without knowing the secret
signal, it would be less interesting for pirates to reverse engineer the detector. The goal is that no one (even the
detector) knows which secret signal has been added. Moreover, if there is a huge amount of possible secret signals,
which match the detection capability, the embedder is able to choose one of these signals. If one secret signal has
been disclosed, the embedder uses a dierent signal. This renewability feature is highly appreciated all the more so
as no change is required at the detection side. Another point is that the embedder can automatically change the
secret signal for each piece of content. If pirates succeed to estimate part of one secret signal (due to a aw listed in
subsection 1.1) via one given piece of watermarked content, they can no more improve this estimation with others
watermarked contents. The knowledge they acquire is only useful to forge this piece of content, but this does not
threaten the whole copy protection system.
Asymmetry stems from this last analysis. The asymmetric schemes should be as robust as symmetric techniques
with a detector needing a set of parameters called the detection key dierent from the embedding's secret key. For
the reasons described above, they are especially dedicated for the copy protection framework.
The understanding of a public key watermarking scheme by the community encloses the following requirements
(this list is part of a discussion between S. Katzenbeisser, J. Bloom, J. Eggers and T. Furon via the mailing list
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):
 An original content is marked with a private key. The presence of a watermark can be checked by using a public
key. Both embedding and detection algorithms are computationally feasible. The publication of the public key
does not allow the computation of the corresponding private key (in reasonable time).
 The original content is not required in the detection process.
 The knowledge of the public key does not allow watermark removal.
 The knowledge of the public key does not allow an attacker to forge a pirated content (a watermarked content
modied so that it cannot any more be considered as protected by the detection).
Thus, a public key watermarking scheme is an improvement with respect to an asymmetric scheme because it has
been proven that the disclosure of the detection key strictly confers no advantage for pirates. Hence, this detection
key is called public key. Note that, J. Smith and C. Dodge already introduced these notions in terms of weak public
key (for asymmetric schemes) and strong public key (for public key watermarking).
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2. FOUR DIFFERENT SCHEMES
In this section, we introduce the four dierent asymmetric watermarking schemes which we are aware of. We give
the expression of the four dierent detection processes D
S
(:); D
E
(:); D
V
(:) and D
F
(:).
2.1. Notation
To compare these dierent methods, we need to introduce common notations. This terminology comes from articles
[10] and [11].
From an original content C
o
belonging to the \media space" (for instance the pixel's domain for still images) the
extraction function X(:) maps it into a vector in the \watermark space": r
o
= X(C
o
). The \watermark space" is,
for instance, a set of DCT coecients for several xed frequencies. Extracted vectors are in this article supposed
to be central, i.e. 
r
o
= Efr
o
g = [0; 0; : : : ; 0]
T
. The role of the \mixing function" f(:; :) is to modify the extracted
vector r
o
into a vector r
w
= f(r
o
;w) which is suciently similar to the vector r
w
. Usually, this \mixing function"
is an addition where r
w
is modulated by a local gain control represented by the vector g: r
w
= r
o
+w ? g where ?
is the term by term product. The vector w is normalized so that 
w
= 1. The embedding strength is controlled via
the vector g. For simplicity sake, we restrict g to be a constant vector g = g[1; 1; : : : ; 1]
T
. We dene the watermark
to original signal power ratio G = g
2
=
2
r
o
. The application of the \inverse extraction" function X
 1
(:) concludes the
embedding process. It maps back from the \watermark space" to the \media space": C
w
= X
 1
(r
w
;C
o
). C
w
is
the watermarked content. The \inverse extraction" needs the original content because the vector r
w
is not sucient
to fully describe a content. In other words, the \media space" has a bigger dimension than the \watermark space",
and, X(:) is not a bijection function. For instance, X
 1
(:) replaces some of the DCT coecients of the original image
by the ones stored in the watermarked vector r
w
, and then, processes the inverse DCT to obtain the watermarked
image.
The detection process tests the received content C
u
. It extracts the vector r
u
= X(C
u
) and decides whether
it belongs to \watermark detection region", noted R
w
, which is the set of all points that the detector categorizes
as containing the watermark. Indeed, this region is dened via a comparison of the detection function D(:) with a
threshold T . Hence, R
w
= frjD(r) > Tg, where T is a positive threshold depending on requirements of the global
system, especially the false alarm probability.
Because r
u
is a priori not known by the detection process, D(r
u
) has to be considered as a random variable. Its
statistical properties, like mean and variance, depend on two hypothesis. H
0
is the hypothesis where r
u
corresponds
to a non watermarked content, whereas H
1
is the hypothesis where r
u
corresponds to a watermarked content. We
dene the detection process eciency by the ratio e, whose expression is as follows
e =
p
2(
D(r
u
jH
1
)
  
D(r
u
jH
0
)
)
q

2
D(r
u
jH
1
)
+ 
2
D(r
u
jH
0
)
(1)
Given a probability of false alarm and the probability density function of the variable D(r
o
), one is able to x
the threshold T to achieve such probability of false alarm. Then the power of the test, which is the ability of the
detector to identify watermark contents, depends on the ratio e. The greater e is, the bigger is the test's power and
the more ecient is the detector.
2.2. The Smith's proposal
J. Smith and C. Dodge proposed a simple asymmetric scheme in [9]. The embedding process hides in the rst part
of the extracted vector r
o
a random Gaussian sequence w. Its length is N=2 (N is even). It is also hidden in the
second part of this extracted sequence.
r
w
[n] = r
o
[n] + gw[mod(n;N=2)] 8n 2 f0; : : : ; N   1g (2)
where mod(:; :) is the modulo function.
The detector process creates two vectors r
1
u
and r
2
u
of length N=2 each. r
1
u
corresponds to the rst part of the
extracted vector r
u
whereas r
2
u
corresponds to its second part. The detection process is then:
cS
= D
S
(r
u
) =
r
1
u
T
:r
2
u
N=2
(3)
Its statistical expectation Efc
S
g is equal to 2(g
2
Efkwk
2
g + gEfw
T
:r
1
o
+w
T
:r
2
o
g + Efr
1
o
T
:r
2
o
g)=N . Under the
hypothesis H
0
, where the unknown content is not watermarked, g has a null value. So that the authors expect
Efc
S
jH
0
g = 2Efr
1
o
T
:r
2
o
g=N = 0, assuming that the rst part of extracted vector is suciently uncorrelated with its
second part. Under the hypothesis H
1
, where the unknown content has been watermarked, g is likely to have a small
value compared to the power of the extracted vector 
2
r
o
, i.e. G 1. Assuming w and r
i
o
are uncorrelated because
independent stochastic processes, Efc
S
jH
1
g = g
2
+2gEfw
T
:r
1
o
+w
T
:r
2
o
g=N = g
2
. But, in real implementation, the
detection output c
S
is not a binary value in f0; g
2
g. It is, indeed, a random variable centered on 0 if H
0
is true, or
on g
2
if H
1
is true, and it shares its probability distribution function with 2(r
o
1
T
:r
o
2
+2gw
T
:r
o
i
)=N . The variance
of this variable is 
2
c
S
= 2(
4
r
o
+ 2g
2

2
r
o
)=N . This leads to the following eciency
e =
g
2
p
N

2
r
o
q
1 +
g
2

2
r
o
=
G
p
N
p
1 +G
/ G
p
N (4)
2.3. The Van Schyndel and Eggers' proposal
We introduce in this subsection an idea rst developed by R. Van Schyndel, A. Tirkel and I.D. Svalbe [12], and
improved by J. Eggers, J. Su and B. Girod in [13] and [14].
Let the N N matrix A represents a linear application in the "watermark space", which is isomorphic to R
N
.
The watermark signal represented by the vectorw of length N is chosen so as to be an eigenvector of this application:
Aw = 
0
w. The detection function is dened as follows:
c = D(r
u
) =
r
u
T
:Ar
u
N
(5)
Its statistical expectation Efcg is equal to (Efr
o
T
:Ar
o
+gr
o
T
(A+A
T
)w+g
2

0
kwk
2
g)=N . Under the hypothesis
H
0
, where the unknown content is not watermarked, g has a null value. The authors expect, then, EfcjH
0
g =
Efr
o
T
:Ar
o
g=N = 0, assuming that the matrix has a suciently decorrelating property. If r
o
is a zero-mean,
stationary random process, the matrix has to render Ar
o
uncorrelated with r
o
. Under the hypothesis H
1
, where
the unknown content has been watermarked, assuming w and A
T
w are uncorrelated with r
o
because independent
stochastic processes, EfcjH
1
g = g
2

0
. The authors roughly investigate the variance of the variable c: the variance of
(r
o
T
(A+A
T
)w)=N is likely to decrease proportional to 
2
r
o
=N as N increases, whereas the variance of (r
o
T
:Ar
o
)=N
is proportional to 
4
r
o
=N . This leads to the following eciency:
e =

0
g
2
p
2N
p
2
4
r
o
+ 2g
2

2
r
o
=

0
G
p
N
p
+ G
/ G
p
N (6)
R. Van Schyndel and al. rst proposed A to be the N N discrete Fourier transform matrix A
V
. J. Eggers and
al. chose A to be a pseudo-random permutation matrix A
E
, in order to increase the robustness against malicious
attacks (cf. subsection 5.2). It means that A
E
is a sparse matrix where there is only one 1 in every column and row,
the other values being set to 0. If (:) is the pseudo-random permutation function, A
E
[i; (i)] = 1. A
E
T
corresponds
to the inverse permutation dened by the function 
 1
(:).
2.4. The Furon's proposal
This is the most complex asymmetric watermarking scheme. It has been rstly proposed in [15]. We presented a
more robust version in [16].
The vectorw is a ltered Gaussian central white noise v with unity variance. It is interleaved by a pseudo-random
permutation (:), whose matrix is noted , before embedding: r
w
= r
o
+ g(h
 v). The lter h is normalized so
that
R
jH(f)j
2
df = 1 and thus 
w
= 1. From now on, we introduce the tilde notation to note the interleaved version
of a vector:
e
r =r.
The detection process needs the amplitude of the frequency response of the lter h and the inverse permutation

 1
(:). A simple hypothesis test decides to which hypothesis the unknown content C
u
is more likely to belong:
 H
0
: The extracted signal r
u
is not watermarked. Assuming that the inverse permutation acts like a perfect
whitening process, the estimated spectrum S
0
(f) of its de-interleaved version
f
r
u
is at. S
0
(f) = 
2
r
u
where 
2
r
u
is
the variance of the tested extracted vector r
u
.
 H
1
: The extracted signal r
u
has been watermarked. Assuming w and r
o
are statistically independent and
stationary random vectors, the following relations hold:
'
er
u
[l] = Ef
f
r
u
[m]:
f
r
u
[m+ l]g = '
er
o
[l] + g
2
'
w
[l]
S
1
(f) = 
er
o
(f) + g
2

w
(f)
where '
er
o
[:] is the correlation function of the de-interleaved version of the vector r
o
and 
er
o
(:) its Fourier transform,
which is the power spectral density of this vector. Because w = h
v, 
w
(f) = jH(f)j
2
. Finally, the power spectral
density expected if H
1
is true, is:
S
1
(f) = 
2
r
o
+ g
2
jH(f)j
2
= 
2
r
u
+ g
2
(jH(f)j
2
  1)
because 
r
u
= 
r
o
= 0 and 
2
r
u
= 
2
r
o
+ g
2
. Thus, under this hypothesis, the estimated spectrum S
1
(f) of the
extracted central signal r
u
is shaped like jH(f)j
2
.
The detection function is dened as a hypothesis test in spectral analysis based on a maximum likelihood:
D
F
(r
u
) = U
N
(
f
r
u
; S
0
)  U
N
(
f
r
u
; S
1
)
where U
N
(x; S
i
) is the Whittle's principal part of the likelihood that the spectrum of the random vector x matches
the power spectral density S
i
(f). Its simplied expression is
U
N
(x; S
i
) =
N
2
X
k=1
log(S
i
(f
k
)) + I
N
(f
k
)=S
i
(f
k
)
where I
N
(f) is the periodogram of the vector x: I
N
(f) =



P
N 1
k=0
x[k]:e
2ikf



2
8f 2]  
1
2
;
1
2
] and f
k
is a Shannon
frequency f
k
= k=N . Finally, the detection process is formulated by:
c
F
= D
F
(r
u
) =
N=2
X
k=1
log(
S
0
(f
k
)
S
1
(f
k
)
) + I
N
(f
k
)(
1
S
0
(f
k
)
 
1
S
1
(f
k
)
) (7)
Under suciently mild conditions, the periodograms values I
N
(f
k
), which are here random variables, have nice
asymptotic properties. As N ! 1, they become mutually independent and identically distributed as a central 
2
with two degrees of freedom. The following relations turn to be true: 
I
N
(f
k
)jH
i
= 
I
N
(f
k
)jH
i
= S
i
(f
k
) i 2 f0; 1g.
As N ! 1, the Riemann sums converge to their integral forms, i.e.:
P
N=2
k=1
log(
S
0
(f
k
)
S
1
(f
k
)
) ! N=2
R
1=2
0
log(
S
0
(f)
S
1
(f)
)df .
After some cumbersome calculus, the eciency is expressed as follows, where b(f) = jH(f)j
2
  1:
e = G
p
N
R
1=2
0
b
2
(f)
(1+Gb(f))
df
q
R
1=2
0
b
2
(f)(1+(1+Gb(f))
2
)
(1+Gb(f))
2
df
/ G
p
N (8)
3. UNIFIED DESCRIPTION
The motivation for this article came from the fact that, despite these four asymmetric methods were invented
independently and a priori are based on completely dierent ideas, their eciencies (4), (6) and (8) are proportional
to G
p
N . We prove now that these methods are indeed based on the same mathematical formulation at the detection
process.
This unied description of the detection function is a quadratic form Q(:) in the \watermark space", so that,
D(r) = Q(r)=N = (r
T
Ar)=N . The Van Schyndel's and the Eggers's detection functions D
V
(:) and D
E
(:) are already
formulated as quadratic forms, where A
V
is the discrete Fourier transform matrix and A
E
is a permutation matrix.
We have to nd the matrices A
S
and A
F
that will allow us to write the Smith's and the Furon's detection functions
D
S
(:) and D
F
(:) as quadratic forms.
3.1. Smith's matrix
Let us note A
S
the following matrix:
A
S
=
1
2

0 I
N=2
I
N=2
0

I
N=2
denotes the
N
2

N
2
identity matrix. Then, the detection process can be written as:
c
S
= D
S
(r
u
) =
r
u
T
:A
S
r
u
N
3.2. Furon's matrix
The periodogram I
N
(f
k
) of the permuted extracted vector
f
r
u
can be expressed by a quadratic form:
I
N
(f
k
) =
f
r
u
T
:P(f
k
)
f
r
u
where P(f
k
) is a cosine kernel
17
:
P (f
k
)[m;n] = cos(2
k
N
(n m))
As S
0
(:) and S
1
(:) depend on the variance 
r
u
of the extracted vector and the estimated embedding depth bg, the
detection process is thus:
c
F
= D
F
(r
u
) = V (
r
u
; bg) +
f
r
u
T
:P(
r
u
; bg)
f
r
u
N
with V (
r
u
; bg) =
P
N=2
k=1
log(
S
0
(f
k
)
S
1
(f
k
)
) and P(
r
u
; bg) = N
P
N=2
k=1
(
1
S
0
(f
k
)
 
1
S
1
(f
k
)
)P(f
k
). The permutation of the extracted
vector r
u
is made by a matrix :
f
r
u
= r
u
. Finally, up to a constant, the detection process is also a quadratic
function with the matrix A
F
(
r
u
; bg) = 
T
P(
r
u
; bg):
c
F
= D
F
(r
u
) = V (
r
u
; bg) +
r
u
T
:A
F
(
r
u
; bg)r
u
N
(9)
We can rewrite the comparison of c
F
with the xed threshold T in the following manner. T
0
(
r
u
; bg) appears to be
an adaptive threshold varying accordingly to the ratio
b
G = (bg=
r
u
)
2
.
r
u
T
:A
F
(
r
u
; bg)r
u
N
>
H
1
<
H
0
T
0
(
r
u
; bg) (10)
where T
0
(
r
u
; bg) = T   V (
r
u
; bg))
3.3. Eciency in the unied approach
We tackle in this subsection the calculus of the detection eciency in the framework of the unied approach by a
quadratic form. The expectation of the detection output is Efcg = EfQ(r
o
)+g(Q(r
o
;w)+Q(w; r
o
))+g
2
Q(w)g=N ,
where Q(x;y) = x
T
Ay is the bilinear form corresponding to the quadratic form Q(:).
Let us recall some classical results about quadratic forms. When x is a vector of random variables, the expected
value of a quadratic form is
Efx
T
Axg = tr(AEfxx
T
g)
We note R
xx
the covariance matrix: R
xx
= Efxx
T
g   EfxgEfx
T
g. We assumed that we deal only with central
extracted vectors, thus EfQ(x)g = tr(AR
xx
). This result does not depend on the distribution of x. However, the
variance of a quadratic form requires that x follows a multivariate normal distribution. Calculus lead to 
2
Q(x)
=
2tr(AR
xx
AR
xx
) + 4Efxg
T
AR
xx
AEfxg = 2tr(AR
xx
AR
xx
). The expected value and the variance of a bilinear
form, in the case of central vectors in input, are then:
Efx
T
Ayg = tr(AR
xy
)

2
Q(x;y)
= tr(AR
xy
T
AR
xy
T
) + tr(AR
yy
A
T
R
xx
)
We denote R = R
r
o
r
o
=
2
r
o
the normalized correlation matrix, and T (:) = tr(:)=dim(:) the normalized trace of a
matrix (dim(:) being the dimension of a square matrix). The eciency is then
e = G
p
N
T (AR
ww
)
p
2T (ARAR) +GT (A(RAR
ww
+R
ww
AR)) +G
2
T (AR
ww
AR
ww
)
/ G
p
N (11)
Eq. (11) is very important. It shows that the eciency e is proportional to G
p
N , in the rst order. The eciency
of classical spread spectrum symmetric schemes is proportional to
p
GN . As G  1, it means that asymmetric are
less ecient than symmetric schemes up to a factor
p
G. If we want to maintain the same eciency, we may increase
the watermark to original power ratio G. This is not really feasible for quality reasons. Another possibility is to
increase the length N of the extracted vector by a factor 1=G. The conclusion is that asymmetric schemes need a
bigger amount of contents to detect watermark presence.
3.4. pdf of the detection ouputs
Under the assumption of central normal distributed extracted vector r
u
, the detection output c will have a central

2
distribution with N degrees of freedom only if AR is idempotent, i.e. ARAR = AR. Else, in the general case,
the moment-generating function of this quadratic form can be expressed as M(t) =
Q
K
i=1
(1  t2
i
)
 
1
=2
where the 
i
are the K distinct, nonzero eigenvalues of AR
r
u
r
u
. Each eigenvalue has multiplicity 
i
. Let's dene some convenient
variables: d
i
=  
1
2
i
and  =
Q
K
i=1
(2
i
)
 
i
=2
. The probability density function of c is then
p
C
(c) =

 (
J
2
)
c
J=2 1

2
(

1
2
; : : : ;

K
2
;
J
2
; d
1
c; d
2
c; : : : ; d
K
c)
where 
2
(:) is the generalized hypergeometric function (extremely cumbersome to calculate), and J is the total
number of nonzero eigenvalues. If all the nonzero eigenvalues have even multiplicities, simplications occur
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:
p
C
(c) = 
K
X
i=1

i
=2
X
j=1
G
ij
1
(j   1)!
c
j 1
e
d
i
c
3.5. Probability of false alarm
The probability of false alarm is dened with P
fa
= 1 P
H
0
(c < T ) = 1 
R
T
 1
p
CjH
0
(c)dc. In the special case where
the pdf is a central 
2
, the probability of false alarm can be calculated via numerical tables. In the general case, the
cumulative function P
H
0
(c < T ) is very cumbersome. In the case of even multiplicities, its expression is
P
H
0
(c < T ) = 
K
X
i=1

i
=2
X
j=1
G
ij
( d
 j
i
)
(j   1)!
(j; d
i
T )
where the incomplete Gamma function is dened as (a; x) =
R
x
0
e
 t
t
a 1
dt.
A classical Cherno's bound can be derived, using the moment-generating function M(t):
P
fa
 e
 tT
M(t) 8t > 0
Then, t
?
= argmax(tT   log(M(t))) is calculated to estimate the best exponential decreasing rate of this bound. We
do not explore in detail here this classical method due to a lack of space.
4. INTERPRETATION
In this section, we give our interpretation in terms of energy distribution of the asymmetric watermarking process.
4.1. Hypothesis H
0
We can nd one orthogonal real matrix O
S
such that O
S
 1
A
S
O
S
is diagonal with real eigenvalues, because A
S
is symmetric. We can also nd one unitary complex matrix O
E
such that O
E
 1
A
E
O
E
is diagonal with complex
eigenvalues, because A
E
is normal (i.e. A
E
H
A
E
= A
E
A
E
H
). The same holds for A
V
thanks to its symmetry.
Following step by step the Furon's method (interleaving, Fourier transform, square module, weighting spectrum),
we can write A
F
= 
T
F
H

F
F, where F is the complex matrix of the discrete Fourier transform and 
F
=
diag(f(1=S
1
(f
1
)  1=S
0
(f
1
)); : : : ; (1=S
1
(f
N 1
)  1=S
0
(f
N 1
))g).
In the Smith, Van Schyndel and Eggers methods, the extracted vectors r
o
are to be white stationary processes.
Hence, R
r
o
r
o
= 
2
r
o
I. Moreover tr(A
S
) = tr(A
V
) = tr(A
E
) = 0. We assumed that an arbitrary random permutation
cannot leave some xed point. It proves that EfcjH
0
g = tr(AR
r
o
r
o
) = tr(
r
o
A) = 0. In the Furon's method,
tr(A
F
R
r
o
r
o
) = tr(F
H

F
FR
er
o
er
o
) We assumed the interleaver behaves like a perfect whitening process, then R
er
o
er
o
=

2
r
o
I. This leads to Efc
F
jH
0
g = 
2
r
o
tr(
F
) = 0 +O(g
2
).
As we found a transform matrix O such that A = OO
 1
, the following interpretation of the detection process
is simply that it transforms the extracted vectors in a new basis where its energy spreads uniformly into each basis
bin. The use of a permutation matrix for some techniques (subsections 2.3 and 2.4) or the need of the white process
assumption for the other ones (subsections 2.2 and 2.3) helps in creating such whitening application A. In this new
space basis, the detection process is indeed the following one:
c =
1
N
N
X
k=1

k
j
o
[k]j
2
where j
o
[k]j
2
is the energy in the k
th
component of this new basis. These energies fj
o
[k]j
2
g in the dierent
eigen-subspaces are supposed to be well balanced, so that Efj
o
[k]j
2
g =
P
j
o
[k]j
2
=N = 
j
o
j
2
8k 2 f1::Ng. The
consequence is that EfcjH
0
g =
1
N
P
N
k=1

k
Efj
o
[k]j
2
g = 
j
o
j
2
P
N
k=1

k
= 0.
4.2. Hypothesis H
1
The watermark vector w is an independent random process. Then, in each frequency bin, the watermark energy
j
gw
[k]j
2
is added in expectation to the energy j
o
[k]j
2
. The embedding of the watermark is then equivalent to
"putting some energy" in some selected subspaces. In the Van Schyndel's, Eggers' and Smith's technique, this
addition of energy is focused in one subspace whose corresponding eigenvalue is positive. In the Furon's technique,
the energy is added in the subspaces (almost) proportionally to their corresponding eigenvalues. The expectation of
the detection output is expressed in (12):
EfcjH
1
g =
1
N
N
X
k=1

k
(Efj
gw
[k]j
2
g   
j
gw
j
2
) (12)
Notice here that the detection function is indeed, in expectation, the correlation between the eigenvalue vector
f
1
; : : : ; 
N
g and the `central' energy vector fEfj
gw
[1]j
2
g   
j
gw
j
2
; : : : ; Efj
gw
[N ]j
2
g   
j
gw
j
2
g
5. SECURITY POINT OF VIEW
5.1. Matrix disclosure
This subsection focuses on asymmetric schemes which are not public key schemes (see subsection 1.2). It means the
detection process is non public. The issue is whether the pirate can estimate the matrix A choosing special input
vectors and observing the output measures:
c =
r
T
:Ar
N
=
1
N
(
N
X
k=1
A
kk
r[k]
2
+
X
1m<lN
(A
lm
+ g
ml
)r[m]r[l])
If r = e
i
for some i, where e
i
= [0; : : : ; 1; : : : ; 0]
T
, then Nc = A
ii
. If r = e
i
+e
j
, then (A
ij
+A
ji
) = Nc A
ii
 A
jj
.
If A is symmetric, with N(N   1)=2 detections, the pirate can fully estimate A. Else, with N(N   1)=2 detections,
the pirate has estimated an equivalent matrix (A+A
T
)=2.
What happens now if the pirate can only access to the comparison to the threshold c > T ? This can be hardly
studied. In classical correlation based symmetric schemes, pirates render the binary detection process sensitive. For
instance, the extracted vector in input is half of a known watermarked vector. Now, every small change in this vector
is likely to produce a detection ip-op. Studying the detection behavior according to several small changes helps
pirates to forge content and especially to estimate the secret key. The detection process, based on a correlation, is
linear: the sum of all these small changes in the extracted vector is likely to result in a forged vector.
6
This is
not the case with an asymmetric scheme because a quadratic form is not linear. But, it does not prove that zero
knowledge of the matrix A is provided.
5.2. Malicious attacks
We deal now with a public key watermarking scheme. Knowing the extraction function X(:) and the matrix A,
pirates are designing attacks dedicated to one specic scheme. They are called malicious attacks in opposition to
the blind attacks (see 1.1). The goal of these attacks is not necessary to estimate the watermark signal, but to fool
the detection process without losing the content quality.
5.2.1. Watermark signal disclosure
Even if pirates know that the watermark energy is focused in a selected subspace (see 4.2), it is practically impossible
to estimate what secret signal has been added if the dimension of this subspace is greater than one. Imagine pirates
build an orthonormal basis in the subspace, whatever linear combination of the vectors of this basis (under the
constraint that the watermark vector energy is unity) is a possible vector w.
5.2.2. The complementary energy distribution attack
Thanks to the interpretation of subsection 4.2, we found the following strategy. Because it is impossible to disclose
the watermark signal, whatever noise n added to the extracted vector, it is an independent process. Thus, its energy
is added in expectation to the energy already present in each subspace. Then, if the energy of this noise is focused on
subspaces whose corresponding eigenvalue are negative, this will decrease the detection output. This energy should
be spread in this optimal way: Efj
n
[k]j
2
g + Efj
gw
[k]j
2
g = cst 8k 2 f1; : : : ; Ng. Because Efj
n
[k]j
2
g > 0, the
constant is then equal to max(Efj
gw
[k]j
2
g). Whereas the global power of gw is equal to g
2
, the power of the noise
added by pirates is equal to max(Efj
gw
[k]j
2
g) g
2
. In order to maximize the distortion due to this malicious attack,
the maximum of the eigenvalues must be as great as possible.
5.2.3. The statistical attack
The strategy of this attack is also to render the expected distribution of the energy in the subspaces Efj
u
[k]j
2
g like
the distribution expected by the detection process under the hypothesis H
0
. Pirates have all the knowledge to create
a new distribution 
p
[k]j
2
as follows:
j
p
[k]j
2
= j
u
[k]j
2
 Efj
u
[k]j
2
jH
1
g+Efj
u
[k]j
2
jH
0
g
Then, the expectation of this new distribution is Efj
p
[k]j
2
g = Efj
u
[k]j
2
jH
0
g. The problem for pirates, now, is
to create an extracted vector r
p
satisfying such energy distribution and leading to a good quality forged content. A
simple way is to use the matrix decomposition A = OO
 1
as in Eq. (13).
r
p
= O
0
B
B
@
j
p
[1]j
j
u
[1]j
0 0
0
.
.
.
0
0 0
j
p
[N ]j
j
u
[N ]j
1
C
C
A
O
 1
r
u
(13)
6. GENERALIZATION AND FUTURE WORK
This section proposes a generalization of the detection process. But we do not have any space to analyze the expected
features of such generalized detector. In classical symmetric schemes, detectors are dened via a correlation like in
Eq. (14). The vector a is the secret key and it is the watermark signal added to extracted vectors.
D(r) =
r
T
a
N
=
1
N
X
i
a
i
r
i
(14)
In asymmetric schemes, detectors are dened via a quadratic form.
D(r) =
r
T
Ar
N
=
1
N
X
i;j
a
i;j
r
i
r
j
(15)
We dene the following natural generalized detection formulation: a n
th
order detection function is dened by Eq.
(16).
D(r) =
P
i
1
;:::;i
n
a
i
1
;:::;i
n
r
i
1
: : : r
i
n
N
(16)
Our future work will be the study of n
th
order detection function. We will especially see whether such detection
process suers from the attacks mentioned in section 5.
As far as we know

, the most accomplished public key watermarking technique is presented in [18]. With this
technique, the detector can retrieve public information by the public key and public and private information by the
private key. This detection process is indeed a 4
th
order detector.
7. CONCLUSION
A common mathematical formulation for asymmetric watermarking schemes was studied in this article. This helps
in stating that asymmetric schemes are less ecient that symmetric ones. Longer extracted vectors compensate this
shortcoming. The statistical behaviour of the detection output is more complicated than for symmetric schemes.We
give an interpretation in term of energy distribution in the eigenspaces of the quadratic form. This helps us to nd
strategies of attacks available for all these schemes. This concludes that this unied approached is not suitable for
public key schemes. More studies are required to fully estimate its security level as an asymmetric scheme.
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